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This paper examines policy responses to exchange-rate movements in a simple model of an open economy.
The optimal response of monetary policy to an exchange-rate change depends on the source of the
change: on whether the underlying shock is a shift in capital flows, manufactured exports, or commodity
prices.  The paper compares the model’s prescriptions to the policies of an actual central bank, the
Bank of Canada.  Finally, the paper considers the role of fiscal policy in an open economy.  Coordinated









     A variety of economic shocks influence exchange rates,
ranging from shifts in investor sentiment to changes in commodity
prices to foreign business cycles.  These shocks also threaten to
destabilize aggregate output and inflation.  In an open economy,
a central question for monetary policy is how to respond to
shocks that affect exchange rates.
     This paper uses a simple macroeconomic model to address this
issue.  I derive the optimal policy responses to different types
of exchange-rate shocks.  I also compare these results to the
practices of an actual central bank, the Bank of Canada.  I focus
on the BOC because it is unusually explicit about its responses
to exchange-rate movements.
     The main conclusions include: 
     C The optimal response to a change in the exchange rate
depends on the cause of the change.  If an appreciation results
from a shift in capital flows, the optimal policy is for the
central bank to reduce interest rates.  If an appreciation
results from a shift in net exports, the optimal response may be
an increase in rates.  These results support the reasoning of the
Bank of Canada.
     C The optimal response to a net-export shock depends on what
part of net exports changes.  If the demand for manufactured
exports rises, then the optimal policy is a tightening.  In2
contrast, if the prices of commodity exports rise, the optimal
response is ambiguous: a decrease in interest rates may be
optimal.  This result conflicts with BOC policies, which include
tightening whenever net exports rise.     
     C The economy is more stable if fiscal as well as monetary
policy responds to shifts in exchange rates.  When only monetary
policy responds, it can stabilize aggregate output, but
inefficient fluctuations occur at the sectoral level: net exports
rise while domestic spending falls, or vice versa.  In contrast,
the right mix of fiscal and monetary policy stabilizes sectoral
output.   
     I derive these results in a model based on undergraduate
textbooks, specifically Mankiw (2007) and Ball (2009).  Before
introducing the model, I discuss a methodological question: why
use a textbook-style model for policy analysis?
II. WHAT TYPE OF MODEL?
     A large literature analyzes monetary policy in open
economies.  This work includes research at central banks, such as
Ragan’s (2005) study of Canada, and academic papers such as
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Gali and Monaceli (2005).  The
present paper complements this literature, as it analyzes a
different type of model.  There are two related differences from
most recent research.  3
     First, my analysis is simpler.  The main model consists of
two identities and three behavioral equations.  Ragan, by
contrast, uses the Bank of Canada’s forecasting model, TOTEM,
which includes at least 78 equations with 51 calibrated
parameters (Murchison and Rennison, 2006).
     Large-scale models have the potential advantage of
quantitative accuracy.  The disadvantage is that large models
yield little economic intuition.  Computers have become powerful
enough to solve models like TOTEM, but the human brain has not
evolved enough to understand them.  Policy prescriptions from
such models come out of a black box.  Simpler models sharpen our
understanding of the economic forces behind results.
     The second difference between this paper and most recent
work is that my model does not have microeconomic foundations.  I
write down equations for macro variables without deriving them
from optimizing behavior of individuals and firms.
     Again, my approach has pros and cons.  Microfoundations
potentially make a model structural, allowing it to account for
changes in agents’ behavior when policy changes.  On the other
hand, an insistence on microfoundations is one reason for the
complexity of many models.   
     In addition, models with microfoundations have elements of
questionable realism.  For example, many open-economy versions of
the models assume purchasing power parity.  In real economies, 4
exchange-rate fluctuations are largely deviations from PPP.  Many
models also include interest-rate parity, a condition rejected
repeatedly in empirical studies.     
     The microfoundations of macroeconomics are at an early stage
of development.  We can hope that micro-based models will
eventually become realistic enough to use in applied policy
analysis.  In the meantime, traditional textbook-style models
have a role.  They capture many economists’ views about the key
macro relationships facing policymakers.  
III. THE BASIC MODEL
     The basic model is similar to ones in Ball (1999) and in the
Mankiw and Ball textbooks.  We start with two identities:
     (1)   Y = D + X
     (2)   X = F ,
where Y is real output, D is total domestic spending
(consumption, investment, and government purchases), X is net
exports, and F is net capital outflows.  Equation (1) is the GDP
accounting identity and equation (2) is the identity relating net
exports and capital flows.  
     The variables D, X, and F are determined as follows:
     (3)   D = D(Y, r)
                 +  -
     (4)   X = X(Y, e)
                 -  -5
     (5)   F = F(r, e)
                 -  +
where r is the real interest rate and e is the real exchange
rate, with a higher e meaning an appreciation.  I interpret all
variables as deviations from long-run equilibrium levels.
     Equations (3) and (4) are standard.  Domestic spending
depends negatively on the real interest rate, and net exports
depend negatively on the real exchange rate.  The partial
derivative DY (MD/MY) is the marginal propensity to spend out of
income; I assume 0<DY<1.  The partial derivative XY is minus the
marginal propensity to import; I assume XY<0 and *XY*<DY.
     Equation (5) is a bit more novel, but captures conventional
thinking about capital flows.  A rise in the real interest rate
makes domestic assets more attractive, reducing net capital
outflows.  As for the exchange rate effect, recall that e is the
deviation of the exchange rate from its long run level.  If this
variable is positive, the exchange rate is expected to fall in
the future.  This makes domestic assets less attractive relative
to foreign assets, raising net capital outflows.
     Substituting (3)-(5) into (1)-(2) gives us
     (6)     Y = D(Y,r) + X(Y,e)
     (7)     X(Y,e) = F(r,e)
These are two equations in three endogenous variables, r, Y, and
e.  I use two different conditions to close the model.  One is
that the central bank holds the real interest rate constant.  To6
capture this case, I simply omit the interest rate from the
model’s equations.  The result is
     THE ECONOMY WITH A FIXED REAL INTEREST RATE
     (8)     Y = D(Y) + X(Y,e)
     (9)     X(Y,e) = F(e)
These are two equations in Y and e.  We can use them to derive
the “direct” effects of shocks: how Y and e change if policy does
not respond.  
     Alternatively, I assume the central bank adjusts the real
interest rate to keep output at its long-run level.  I omit Y
from the D(C), X(C), and F(C) functions, and set Y=0 on the left
side of (6) (since Y is the deviation from long-run output). 
Then (6) and (7) become
     THE ECONOMY WITH STABILIZING POLICY
     (10)     0 = D(r) + X(e)
     (11)     X(e) = F(e,r)
These are two equations in e and r.  They determine the policy
response to a shock when the central bank stabilizes output. 
They also determine the total effect of the shock and policy1 I do not explicitly model the behavior of inflation.  One
can add inflation to the model through a Phillips curve that
relates changes in inflation to fluctuations in output.  With
this extension of the model, policies that stabilize output
stabilize inflation as well.  Therefore, these policies are
appropriate for an inflation-targeting central bank, such as the
Bank of Canada. 
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response on the exchange rate.1
     It can be useful to express the model graphically,
especially the version with stabilizing policy.  Figure 1 shows
conditions (10) and (11).  Given our assumptions about the D(C)
and X(C) functions, condition (10) is downward sloping.  We will
call it the YS curve for “output stabilization.”  It shows the
combinations of r and e that keep output at its long run level. 
If the exchange rate appreciates, the central bank offsets the
contractionary effect with a lower interest rate.
     Equation (11), which is upward sloping, reflects equilibrium
in the foreign exchange market; we will call it the FE curve. 
Along this curve, a higher interest rate makes domestic assets
more attractive, pushing up the exchange rate.  The intersection
of the FE and YS curves determines the equilibrium exchange rate
and interest rate.
IV. SHOCKS
     The shocks in the model are shifts in the D(C), X(C), and
F(C) functions, which I will call domestic-demand shocks, net-
export shocks, and capital-flow shocks.  Domestic-demand shocks8
are like IS shocks in a closed-economy model; they include
changes in consumer confidence or in government spending, for
example.  Net-export shocks could arise from changes in the
prices of commodity exports or from business cycles in trading
partners.  Capital-flow shocks reflect changes in investor
confidence in foreign and domestic assets.
     I interpret all shocks as temporary.  They cause the
exchange rate and other variables to deviate from fixed long-run
levels.  Future research might consider shocks that shift the
exchange rate permanently.
     If a central bank seeks to stabilize output, the appropriate
response to an exchange-rate movement depends on the underlying
shock.  One central bank that recognizes this point is the Bank
of Canada.  To my knowledge, the BOC is the only central bank
that has explicitly defined different types of exchange-rate
shocks and described its responses.  Throughout this paper, I
will compare my results to the BOC’s practices.
     The BOC distinguishes between “Type One” and “Type Two”
exchange-rate movements.  In 2005, Governor Dodge defined Type I
movements as those reflecting shifts in “global demand for
Canada’s goods and services.”  Type II shocks “reflect the
rebalancing of portfolios in financial markets, which may have
nothing to do with current demand for Canadian goods and
services.”  Ragan (2005) provides details about what events count9
as Type I or Type II shocks.  
     Type II shocks appear equivalent to capital-flow shocks in
my model.  Ragan’s examples of Type II shocks include “an
adjustment in financial portfolios toward Canadian assets” and “a
flow of financial capital into Canada to finance the purchase of
existing physical capital.”  Like Type II shocks, my capital-flow
shocks do not directly affect the demand for goods and services,
because F(C) does not appear in (6), the basic equation for GDP.  
     Type I shocks are similar to net-export shocks in my model. 
Ragan’s examples of Type I shocks include “an increase in world
relative demand for Canadian-produced goods and services” and “an
increase in the world prices of raw materials which leads to an
increase in income to Canadian commodity exporters.” Notice that
neither the Type I nor Type II category covers the domestic-
demand shocks in my model.  Most BOC discussions of exchange
rates ignore shifts in domestic demand.
     The correspondence between Type I shocks and net-export
shocks is not perfect.  Ragan’s list of Type I shocks includes
“greenfield investment,” meaning “a flow of foreign financial
capital into Canada to finance new investment in Canadian
physical capital.”  In my model, I would interpret such an event
as a combination of a domestic-demand shock (the new investment)
and a capital-flow shock.10
V. EFFECTS OF SHOCKS
     Let’s see how the model’s three shocks affect the economy:
their direct effects when the central bank holds the interest
rate constant, and their total effects when the central bank
stabilizes output.  For either case, one can derive a shock’s
effects by totally differentiating the two equations defining
equilibrium.  However, the results are usually obvious and/or
explicable with Figure 1, so I skip formal derivations.  
     The effects of the shocks, summarized in Table I, are the
following:
   C A rise in domestic demand: The direct effect is to raise
output and reduce the exchange rate.  The exchange rate falls
because higher income raises imports and hence the demand for
foreign currency.  When the central bank stabilizes output, it
raises the real interest rate and the total exchange-rate effect
is positive.  Figure 2A illustrates the stabilizing-policy case.
The domestic-demand shock shifts the YS curve to the right (a
higher r is needed for a given e), raising the equilibrium r and
e.
    C A rise in net capital outflows: Here, domestic assets
become less attractive relative to foreign assets.  The direct
effects are a lower exchange rate and higher output.  Output
rises because the lower exchange rate raises net exports.  In the
stabilizing-policy case, the FE curve shifts down and the economy2 To see that r must rise in the stabilizing-policy case,
substitute equation (11) into equation (10), which produces 0 =
D(r) + F(e,r).  This defines a positive relation between r and e
that is not shifted by a net export shock.  Since e rises, r must
also rise.
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moves along the YS curve (Figure 2B).  The interest rate rises.  
The exchange rate falls but by less than the direct effect,
because of the higher interest rate.
    C A rise in net exports: The direct effects are higher output
and a higher exchange rate.  In the stabilizing-policy case, both
the YS and FE curves shift up, raising the exchange rate (Figure
2C).  The two shifts have opposite effects on the interest rate,
but the net effect is positive; the interest rate must rise to
prevent the shock from raising output.  Because the interest rate
rises, the total increase in the exchange rate is greater than
the direct effect.2
     So far, my results for the stabilizing-policy case are
consistent with policy at the Bank of Canada.  According to Ragan
(2005), the BOC raises interest rates when a Type I shock causes
an appreciation of the Canadian dollar, and lowers rates when a
Type II shock causes an appreciation.  Recall that Type I and II
shocks are roughly equivalent to net-export and capital-flow
shocks respectively.  Thus BOC policies match the results in
Table I.3 The benefits of sectoral stability could be derived
formally in a standard macro-with-microfoundations model (see
Romer [2006] or Woodford [2003]).  In these models, welfare is
reduced by dispersion in output across firms as well as by
variability in aggregate output.
4 Future work should revisit the definition of sectors.  In
reality, some tradeable sectors, such as autos, are interest-rate
sensitive, which is ruled out here.  A richer model might have
several sectors defined by varying combinations of interest-rate
sensitivity and exchange-rate sensitivity.
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VI. SECTORAL STABILITY AND FISCAL POLICY
     So far, we have derived policies that stabilize aggregate
output when exchange rates change.  However, economic welfare
depends on output stability at the sectoral as well as aggregate
level.  It is inefficient to have a boom in one sector and a
recession in another, even if the deviations from long-run output
average to zero.  This issue is particularly important in open
economies, because fluctuations in exchange rates affect some
sectors and not others.3
     I will assume that D and X give output levels in two sectors
of the economy and label them the “domestic” sector and the
“export” sector.  The latter includes import-competing industries
as well as exporters.  We can think of the domestic and export
sectors as roughly equivalent to the non-tradeable sector, which
is not influenced by the real exchange rate, and the tradeable
sector, which is.4  
     For each of the model’s three shocks, the appropriate
monetary response, shown in Table I, keeps aggregate output13
constant.  In each case, however, output is unstable at the
sectoral level: a rise in D is balanced by a fall in X, or vice
versa.  For example, a rise in capital outflows reduces D
(because the interest rate rises) while raising X (because the
exchange rate falls).
     Sectoral output can be stabilized if policymakers have an
additional instrument besides the interest rate.  A natural
second instrument is fiscal policy.  If we add a fiscal variable
to the model, the right combination of fiscal and monetary policy
can stabilize both D and X.
     To formalize this point, I start with the model in which
monetary policy stabilizes aggregate output, equations (10)-(11). 
Extend this model in two ways.  First, include taxes, T, in the
domestic demand function: D = D(r,T).  Assume -1<DT<0.  Second,
assume policy stabilizes domestic-sector output: D=0. Since (10)
and (11) already impose Y=0, adding D=0 implies X=0 as well.
Output is constant in both sectors.  The model becomes
     THE ECONOMY WITH SECTORAL STABILITY
   (12)     0 = D(r,T) + X(e)
   (13)     X(e) = F(e,r)
   (14)     0 = D(r,T) .
This model is three equations in three variables, e, r, and T. 14
It determines how the interest rate and taxes respond to shocks,
and the total effects on the exchange rate.  
     As an example of applying this model, consider a rise in
capital outflows.  As we’ve discussed, a monetary tightening
alone can stabilize aggregate output, but X rises and D falls. 
Using (12)-(14), one can show that X and D are stabilized by an
increase in the interest rate and a cut in taxes.  The interest
rate increase is greater than the increase when only monetary
policy stabilizes output.  The exchange rate stays constant at
its long run level: the two policy responses fully offset the
effect of the capital-flow shock.
     One can also use (12)-(14) to derive policy responses to
domestic-demand and net-export shocks.  I will skip the details. 
The overall point is that combining fiscal and monetary policy
always improves on monetary policy alone in stabilizing sectoral
output.
     Of course this theoretical result raises practical
questions.  Under most countries’ political systems, it is
difficult to coordinate fiscal and monetary policy.  However,
movements toward greater coordination are possible, as discussed
in Ball (2008).  The potential benefits are large given the costs
of sectoral fluctuations, which I discuss further below.15
VII. COMMODITY EXPORTS VS. MANUFACTURED EXPORTS
     So far I’ve distinguished between an economy’s domestic and
export sectors.  Another important distinction concerns two types
of exports, commodities and manufactured goods.  Changes in
commodity prices can move commodity exports and manufactured
exports in opposite directions.  In particular, higher commodity
prices can cause the “Dutch disease.”  Commodity exports rise,
but that causes an exchange-rate appreciation that reduces
manufactured exports.
     This effect has been important in Canada in recent years. 
Canada exports oil, gas, and metals.  The prices of these
commodities rose over 2003-2007, raising total exports, causing
an appreciation of the Canadian dollar, and making manufacturing
industries less competitive.
     The Bank of Canada classifies any rise in net exports as a
Type I exchange-rate shock, which calls for an increase in
interest rates.  BOC economists are explicit that policy should
tighten even when the underlying shock is a rise in commodity
prices.  In this case, says Ragan (2005), 
many firms and workers in the contracting sectors will begin to
feel the crowding-out effect associated with the Dutch disease. 
Often at this point some commentators urge the Bank to prevent
and even reverse the appreciation of the currency by reducing
interest rates.... however, the appropriate response for the Bank
in this case would be to tighten its monetary policy further...
causing a further appreciation of the Canadian dollar.” 
In other words, the BOC acknowledges that the Dutch disease hurts5 To understand this approximation, let C* be the absolute
level of commodity exports measured in foreign currency, and let
e* be the level of the real exchange rate.  Commodity exports in
local currency are C*/e*.  We can normalize C* and e* so their
long run levels are both one.  C and e are defined as deviations
from these long run levels.  A first-order approximation of C*/e*
is 1+(C*-1)-(e*-1) = 1+C-e.  The deviation of C*/e* from its long
run level is approximately C-e.
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manufacturing, but believes the best response is a tightening
that further hurts manufacturing.
     I question this view on two grounds.  First, as already
discussed, a combination of fiscal and monetary policy can
eliminate the sectoral effects of shocks.  Second, even if
monetary policy is the only tool, a tightening may not be the
optimal response to higher commodity prices.  
Modifying the Model
     To address these issues, I assume net exports, X, has two
components.  One is net exports of manufactured goods, M.  Like X
in the basic model, this variable depends on the real exchange
rate and income: M=M(e,Y).
     The other component of net exports is commodities.  Let C be 
net exports of commodities valued in foreign currency.  Net
exports in local currency can be approximated by C - e, given
that all variables are deviations from long run levels.
5 
     I assume that C, the foreign-currency value of commodity
exports, is exogenous.  To interpret this assumption, consider
Canada’s oil exports.  Suppose the physical quantity of these17
exports is constant: the oil industry pumps a fixed number of
barrels from the ground.  The value of these exports in foreign
currency –- specifically U.S. dollars –- is determined by the
world price of oil, which is set in U.S. dollars.  Fluctuations
in this price are exogenous to Canada.
     Total net exports in local currency are the sum of
manufactured and commodity exports: 
     (15)     X = M(e,Y) + C - e
With this specification of X, the basic model of the economy,
equations (6)-(7), becomes
     (16)     Y = D(r,Y) + M(e,Y) + C - e
     (17)     M(e,Y) + C - e = F(e,r) .
     As in my basic model (Sections III-V), I ignore fiscal
policy and assume the interest rate r is the only policy
instrument.  In this case, however, I do not assume the central
bank adjusts r to stabilize Y.  Instead, it stabilizes Y - (c-e),
or real GDP excluding commodity exports.  Equivalently, the
central bank sets Y = c-e: it accommodates changes in income
caused by changes in commodity prices.  These are real shocks
that change potential GDP; for our purposes, higher oil prices
are equivalent to more productive oil wells.  When commodity
exports rise, stabilizing Y would require a decrease in non-6 Again, this welfare argument could be formalized in a
standard macro model with microfoundations.
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commodity output, which would be inefficient.6
     When policy sets Y=c-e, equations (16) and (17) become
   THE ECONOMY WITH STABILIZATION OF NON-COMMODITY GDP
     (18)     0 = D(r,C-e) + M(e,C-e)
     (19)     M(e,C-e) + C - e = F(e,r) 
These two equations determine r and e (again, C is exogenous).   
Responses to Shocks
     We can use equations (18)-(19) to determine how monetary
policy responds to shocks when it stabilizes non-commodity
output.  The responses to domestic-demand and capital-flow shocks
are similar to those in the basic model of Sections III-V.  When
net exports shift, the response depends on the source of the
shift:
     C A Rise in Manufactured Exports: In this case, the M(C)
function shifts up.  The central bank’s response is similar to
its response to a net-export shock in the basic model: it raises
the interest rate.  The shock directly raises the exchange rate,
and the policy response raises the exchange rate further.
     C A Rise in Commodity Prices: This shock raises C, the
foreign-currency value of commodity exports.  We can determine7 Differentiating (18)-(19) yields dr/dc = [DYMe-DYFe-MYFe-
Me]/[Dr(Fe-Me+MY+1)-Fr(Me-DY-MY)].  To see that this effect is
ambiguous, note for example that it is positive if DY=1 and MY=0
and negative if DY=MY=0.
8  More precisely, let M(e,Y)=M’(e,Y)+Z, where the function
M’(C) is fixed.  One can show that dr/dZ > dr/dC.
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the effects by differentiating (18)-(19) with respect to C.  The
key results are:
   1. The effect on r is ambiguous: the central bank may raise or
lower the interest rate.7  
   2. Even if the increase in C raises r, this effect is smaller
than the rise in r caused by an equal-sized increase in
manufactured exports.8  
   3. The increase in C raises the exchange rate, e.  The total
rise in e can be larger or smaller than the direct effect of the
shock, depending on whether r rises or falls.
     Why does policy respond differently to shifts in commodity
and manufactured exports?  Recall that policy stabilizes non-
commodity output, Y-(c-e).  An increase in manufactured exports
directly raises non-commodity output, so policy must tighten to
offset this effect.  A rise in commodity exports does not
directly affect non-commodity output.  It affects it indirectly,
because total income rises, raising domestic spending.  However, 
this effect is smaller than that of higher manufactured exports. 
As a result, a smaller monetary tightening (if any) is needed to
stabilize non-commodity output.  This explains Result 2 above.  9 As in Section VI, we can extend the model to include taxes
in the domestic demand function.  In this case, a combination of
fiscal and monetary policy can stabilize both manufactured
exports and output in the domestic sector, while accommodating
shifts in commodity exports.  Once again, policy responds
differently to shifts in M(C) and changes in C.  When M(C) shifts
up, sectoral output is stabilized by a combination of tighter
monetary policy and looser fiscal policy. When C rises, fiscal
policy tightens, and it is more likely that monetary policy
loosens than when it is the only instrument.     
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     Result 1 says the policy response to a rise in commodity
exports is ambiguous.  The explanation is that this shock has
both a positive and a negative effect on non-commodity output. 
The positive effect is the rise in domestic spending resulting
from higher income.  The negative effect is the Dutch disease –-
a fall in manufactured exports resulting from a higher exchange
rate.  The sum of these two effects is ambiguous, so offsetting
them may require either tighter or looser policy.
     We can gain further insight by examining the condition that
determines whether policy tightens or loosens.  For simplicity,
let MY=0 (the marginal propensity to import is zero).  In this
case, the interest rate rises in response to higher commodity
prices if and only if
     (20)      DY  > (-Xe)/(-Xe+Fe) .
That is, policy tightens if the marginal propensity to spend is
sufficiently high.  When (20) holds, the expansionary effect of
higher commodity prices –- the effect of higher income on
spending -- outweighs the contractionary effect.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
     This paper considers the response of monetary policy to
exchange-rate movements in a simple macroeconomic model.  The
optimal response depends on why the exchange rate changes.  When
an appreciation occurs, it is optimal to lower the interest rate
if the underlying shock is a shift in capital flows, but raise
the interest rate if the shock is higher domestic spending.  If
the shock is higher net exports, the optimal response depends on
why exports rise.  If the reason is higher demand for
manufactured exports, it is optimal for policy to tighten; if the
reason is higher prices for commodity exports, the optimal
response is ambiguous.
     These results support the policies of the Bank of Canada -- 
except the result about commodity prices.  The Bank argues that
tighter policy is necessary whenever net exports rise.  In my
model, however, a rise in exports resulting from higher commodity
prices can reduce output relative to the efficient level. The
contractionary effect of the Dutch disease can outweigh the
expansionary effect of higher income.  In this case, a monetary
easing is optimal.
     This paper also considers the role of fiscal policy in an
open economy.  Monetary policy alone can stabilize aggregate
output, but inefficient fluctuations occur in the economy’s
domestic and export sectors.  Coordinated fiscal and monetary22
policies can stabilize sectoral output.   23
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Table 1
EFFECTS OF SHOCKS (BASIC MODEL)
          Direct effect   Direct effect   Response   Total effect
            on Y            on e            of r       on e
8 Domestic
   Demand   +              -             +           +
8 Net Exports    +              +             +           +
                                                     (> direct
                                                        effect)
8 Net Capital    +              -             +           -
   Outflows                                          (< direct
                                                        effect)